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Response to Comments
Response to Comments on “Science’s
Imagined Pasts”
Adrian Wilson, University of Leeds
Abstract: The four generous responses to “Science’s Imagined Pasts” here commented
on fruitfully extend its argument. In particular, all of them resonate with—even though
only one of them explicitly addresses—its concluding theme of the “second scientiﬁc
revolution.”
W ith the aid of these thoughtful and wide-ranging responses, I can see that each of thethree claims put forward in “Science’s Imagined Pasts” either fell into (the ﬁrst two),
or invoked (the third), a distinct domain. What makes that visible is the fact that different re-
spondents have focused on different domains, albeit with some overlap.
The ﬁrst claim concerned the microprocesses of the sciences themselves: the argument here
was that the construction of a past was an intrinsic and distinctive aspect of the sciences, since
“science does this to a peculiar degree.” The essay did instance the literature review as a key
example of how this happens, but for the most part it evidenced this claim only indirectly—for
instance, via Bruno Latour’s asymmetrical Janus-face depiction of science. Thus the essay was
invoking, but not exploring, the ensemble of activities that go to make up the sciences. This
domain is discussed by Alexander Blum and by William Thomas.
The second claim pertained to the past historiography of science. “The theme of science’s
imagined pasts,” I argued, “seems never to come into sustained focus”: the essay suggested that
historians of science have repeatedly touched on that theme yet have never succeeded in sys-
tematically addressing it. That argument was illustrated in various ways, such as (to remain with
the same example) the fact that Latour’s Janus picture has received no scholarly discussion.
This domain has been explored by William Thomas (again) and by Massimiliano Badino.
The third claim again referred to the historiography of science, but this time in the future:
“the creation and roles of such imagined scientiﬁc pasts,” the essay proposed, “will richly repay
closer and wider study.” While various research possibilities in this area were sketched in an in-
principle way, what stood out—and served as the punch line of the essay—was a single speciﬁc
example, namely the so-called “second scientiﬁc revolution.” The discussion of that theme,
which rested heavily on papers by Simon Schaffer, Timothy Alborn, and Andrew Cunning-
ham, put together a historical claim (Schaffer, Alborn) and a historiographic one (Cunning-
ham). The historical claim was that nineteenth-century science differed profoundly from its
eighteenth-century predecessor natural philosophy; the historiographic claim was that this dif-
ference had been suppressed at the outset—for instance, by William Whewell—and remains
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so to this day, obscured by the very term “history of science.” That example belonged to a third
domain, which might be characterized as the relationship between science’s history and its his-
toriography. And this is the domain addressed by Kathryn Olesko: as we shall see, it emerges in
or from all four commentaries, but hers alone takes this as its central focus.
The natural sequence in which to discuss these responses, then, is Blum–Thomas–Badino–
Olesko.
Blum opens with a delicious observation: “Wilson has, somewhat ironically, been led astray
by his own construction of an imagined past for the history of science, more speciﬁcally by
taking Chapter 11 of Thomas S. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions as a starting point
for his discussion.” I’m not sure whether in using Kuhn I was constructing an imagined past,
but the irony would be so neat that I rather hope I was! In any case, what Blum stresses is that
“Kuhn’s Chapter 11 is a problematic starting point”—and this “for two reasons.” The ﬁrst of
those reasons is Kuhn’s focus on textbooks, rather than on literature reviews and citation prac-
tices. The second, which arose from Kuhn’s speciﬁc polemical needs, was a focus on explicit,
reﬂective engagement with history, which is not “integral” to science but occasional—found in
contexts (including textbooks) that draw forth “an explicit, self-conscious presentation of a
ﬁeld’s history.” In contrast, what is far more important (Blum argues) is “the implicit construc-
tion of that history through literature review and citation behavior,” which, as he rightly re-
marks, “most scientists do not think of as a historical activity at all.” This latter activity he calls
the “intrinsic history writing of science.”
I suspect that those two anti-Kuhn considerations are in fact one—but the point is powerful
and persuasive, and to my mind radically improves the argument of “Science’s Imagined
Pasts.” As Blum goes on to argue, the literature review is speciﬁc to science and integral to sci-
ence, and it is through this, along with citation practices, that the sciences construct their imag-
ined pasts. In expounding this picture, Blum makes a point that I’d like to appropriate for a
different purpose. “One may rightly interject,” he remarks, “that the literature review as I have
invoked it here is a rather recent phenomenon. . . . But I would argue that this hardly inval-
idates my claim. Indeed, I ﬁnd it quite plausible that science would establish its own unique,
intrinsic form of writing its own history only in the later stages of its development.” Blum’s pro-
posal here is that the literature review itself has a history—and one that is worth exploring. I
agree, and I suggest that we might stretch that theme back in time as yet another aspect of what
separated the sciences from natural philosophy.
Further, Blum endorses the third claim of my essay, once again taking this in a direction I
had not envisaged: his view is that a proper understanding of scientists’ “intrinsic historiogra-
phy”—his key term of art—will shed new light on the very nature of science. Here he argues
that “scientists can actually be quite good at this kind of history, which is an essential part of
their work”; and he illustrates this with the story of the Dancoff myth (promoted, it seems, by
J. Robert Oppenheimer for his own purposes), which nicely exempliﬁes scientists (other than
Oppenheimer) doing a better job than historians (who were taken in by the myth). Blum con-
cludes by proposing that we investigate just how scientists go about making their histories, em-
phasizing a focus on “how scientists read their historical sources.” With all of this I am in com-
plete agreement.1
1 My agreement includes the emphasis on reconstructing the reading of sources (rather than on analyzing the written product) as
what most merits attention in the analysis of historiographic practice (in this case, the historiographic practice of scientists). See
below, in my discussion of Badino’s essay.
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Thomas’s essay both begins and ends by exploring this same theme—the characteristic prac-
tices of scientists—and what he says on this score ﬁts remarkably well with Blum. I shall look at
this part of his argument before turning to its other, historiographic, dimension.
Thomas starts by making a distinction between “what we can call epistemic pasts” and “what
we could call mythic pasts.” “Epistemic pasts” correspond closely to what Blum calls “intrinsic
historiography”; “mythic pasts” resemble (andmay perhaps be identical to) Blum’s “explicit, self-
conscious presentation of a ﬁeld’s history.” Although Thomas doesn’t have much to say about
“epistemic pasts,”what he does say is entirely consonant with Blum’s picture. Thus it is “through
their cited references” that scientists construct their epistemic pasts, which precisely matches
Blum’s characterization of intrinsic historiography as founded on literature reviews and citations;
and as we shall see, his concluding proposals also harmonize with those of Blum.
The main focus of Thomas’s discussion is on “mythic pasts,” which of course means that his
essay and Blum’s are precisely complementary to one another. (Blum, it will be recalled, concen-
trates on epistemic pasts rather than mythic ones, or, in his own terms, on “implicit” rather than
“explicit” historiography. Nevertheless, although Blum does not explicitly address the latter
theme, what he writes about the Dancoff myth is in line with what Thomas argues on this score.)
The “primary function” of mythic pasts, Thomas explains, “is to forge identity, solidarity, and
a sense of purpose”; and he goes on to suggest that there may be tension between mythic and
epistemic scientiﬁc pasts and that this would be a worthwhile theme for historians to investigate.
But the crucial step in his essay is to apply the notion of mythic pasts to the discipline of history
and, speciﬁcally, the history of science. This is the core claim: “Interestingly and alarmingly, the
primary mythic narrative of the history of science profession seems to be intimately connected
with historians’ mythic conceptions about the scientists they study. Speciﬁcally, historians are
apt to regard scientists, and society more generally, as heavily burdened by misconceived and in-
jurious ideas about the nature of science. In turn, historians regard themselves as destined to dis-
pel such ideas through careful, critically informed scholarly research and advocacy.” After run-
ning through a series of examples—Kuhn,Mulkay, Bloor, Shapin—Thomas comments: “Implicit
within this notion that historians were freeing themselves from scientist-derived conceptions of sci-
ence was the idea that scientists had indeed traditionally—and thus historically—misconceived or
dissembled about their work.”
This claim is ingenious, and highly so. It is ingenious in the literal sense: that is, it’s a product
of Thomas’s genius—or, in other words, he has made it up. The clue is the giveaway word “im-
plicit,” which tells us that what follows is something that hasn’t actually been said by any of the
authorities just cited. And a glance at the presented examples conﬁrms this. What is quoted from
Kuhn is the famous remark about “the image of science by which we are now possessed” (not the
image of science by which scientists are possessed); fromMulkay, his critique of Merton’s norms
(the work of a sociologist, not a scientist); what’s said of Bloor is that he “cast prior generations of
sociologists as lacking the ‘nerve’ to apply their analytical methods to the production of scientiﬁc
knowledge” (nothing here about any illusions among scientists themselves); and of Shapin, that
“he suggested that prior history had been built up around idealized conceptions of sciencemeant
to buttress its authority” (here the ignoramuses are historians, not scientists).
Conceivably Thomas, or someone else, can ﬁnd a smoking gun to support his claim, but as
it stands there is nothing going for that claim. And it may well be that historians-cum-sociologists
of science are swayed by one or more mythic narratives; but if so, it remains to be seen just what
those mythic narratives are.
Thomas’s bête noire is Steven Shapin, and his culminating example is Leviathan and the
Air-Pump, which he depicts as having set the seal on historians’ myth-about-scientists by sup-
plying it with exempliﬁcation. Yet, remarkably, he immediately places a wedge between that
book’s coauthors, for he goes on to extol the early work of Simon Schaffer (including “Scien-
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tiﬁc Discoveries and the End of Natural Philosophy”)—speciﬁcally, for demonstrating that
eighteenth-century natural philosophers were “talented critics and reformers of their own en-
terprise.” Thomas praises this work highly and at some length, proposing that such explorations
should be extended from natural philosophy to science:
The kind of attention that Schaffer dedicated to the intricacy and sophistication of nat-
ural philosophers’ thinking is important not only for historians’ understanding of what
natural philosophy was and how it evolved and ended. There are certainly analogous sit-
uations permeating the entire history of the sciences. Historians are used to investigating
the links between scientiﬁc knowledge, research practices, genre conventions, institu-
tional structures, and cultural priorities. They are, I feel, less attuned to how scientists
themselves have thought about, engineered, and re-engineered these links.
And he concludes by suggesting that scientists’ imagined pasts are worthy of study as “one of
many windows into scientiﬁc thinking.”
This proposal—which is very much in line with Blum’s but extends it in several directions—
strikes me as very fertile indeed. I would add that such an exploration of the activities of scientists,
when juxtaposed against the corresponding activities of natural philosophers, bids fair to shed
considerable light on the transition from natural philosophy to science, as of course we should
expect given that it was precisely Schaffer’s “Scientiﬁc Discoveries and the End of Natural Phi-
losophy” that, for an Anglophone audience, opened up that theme.
I turn next to Badino’s engaging discussion of the historiographic theme. In a nutshell, I
ﬁnd myself welcoming both the question that Badino asks at the beginning and the exploration
that he suggests at the end, while disagreeing with the premise that links these.
Badino begins by illustrating “imagined pasts” with a beautiful story—more properly, a story
about a story—which, as it happens, could be seen as connected with the “second scientiﬁc rev-
olution.” Astronomers have come to believe that “the problem of the stability of the solar system
was ﬁrst posed by Isaac Newton in the late seventeenth century and then, after much labor,
solved by Pierre Simon Laplace in 1773.” Having demolished that picture, Badino sketches
how it was put in place—by a surprising yet intelligible collusion between Laplace and (a gen-
eration or so later) Whewell. The excellent point that Badino thereby makes is that “the paths
through which imagined pasts are established and accepted often make for interesting and re-
vealing stories in their own right.” And he goes on to ask, “Why have historians of science paid
no heed whatsoever to this and countless similar stories?”
His answer is that were historians to embark upon analysis of “the process of imagining the
past,” this “would expose ﬂaws they themselves are not immune to.” Imagined pasts are “ﬁc-
tions,” ﬁctions with “multiple purposes” that all serve present interests and are far removed from
the “serene and disinterested contemplation” to which historians are supposed to aspire; explor-
ing the genesis of such ﬁctions would bring to light the troubling fact that history itself is not so
different. Drawing onWilliamMcNeill’s notion of “mythistory,” Badino argues that “the past . . .
is not an autonomous entity to be unearthed and gazed at”; that “history cannot be neutral”; and
that, as a corollary, “historians cannot be ‘biased’ with respect to an allegedly objective past ‘out
there.’ ” And all of this, Badino suggests, historians in general and historians of science in partic-
ular are unwilling to face: “Historians of science, I believe, do not deal willingly with science’s
imagined past for the same reason that historians in general are loath to deal with the ﬁctional
nature of history as a scholarly discipline . . .: because it lays bare intrinsic aspects of the very
act of history writing that can potentially lead to its debunking as mere politics or rhetoric.”
Badino presents this as what he believes, but for the reader it has the status of a hypothesis;
and while that hypothesis might be true, it remains a mere hypothesis, since Badino offers no
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evidence in support. For myself, I ﬁnd it unlikely that the overlooking of imagined pasts arises
from such timorousness; it seems to me that the theme has not been censored but, rather, has
not been brought to mind, though I have no counterhypothesis as to why that should be so.
Further, the hypothesis leads Badino down an argumentative blind alley. He goes on to say
that “this fear, albeit understandable, is . . . misplaced,” because “even if narrating the past im-
plies, partly and inevitably, constructing it, this does not entail that one cannot distinguish be-
tween good and bad ﬁctions.” This choice of words (“ﬁctions”) suggests that the criterion of
historiographic worth has nothing to do with truth; yet the subsequent discussion entirely con-
tradicts this, invoking as it does distinctions such as that between “interpreting and misinter-
preting,” which has to involve a truth criterion if it is to serve any purpose at all in this context.
And of course the historian has to aim at historical truth in order to achieve results such as
those that Badino laid out so well at the beginning of his piece, when he uncovered the making
of the myth about the solar system stability problem.
Badino concludes, however, with a claim that I endorse: that just as it will be fruitful to explore
science’s imagined pasts, so also it will be worth investigating the nature of the historical discipline
itself. While it is not entirely true that “we are still lacking empirical studies on the practices of his-
tory,” it is certainly the case that more could be done in this regard, particularly on historical infer-
ence (the traditional theme, now long out of fashion) and its relationship to historical writing (the
topic that has dominated since about 1980). But that would be, as they say, another story.2
So, ﬁnally, to Olesko, whose comments center on the “second scientiﬁc revolution.”Olesko’s
opening point that imagined pasts “become constitutive of the present” is elegant; and her idea
that “scientists’ coming to terms with their collective past” resembles the process of “a nation’s
people coming to terms with its past” is intriguing. I suspect that there are differences, but there
are certainly resemblances: famously, Ernest Renan argued in 1882 that “forgetting, and even
historical error, are essential factor[s] in the creation of a nation,” a form of words close to what
Alfred North Whitehead was to claim about the sciences some thirty-four years later.3 Olesko’s
main point, however, concerns the shift “from natural philosophy to physics,” particularly in
Germany and as illuminated by the work of Rudolf Stichweh, published as long ago as 1984:
thanks to Stichweh and others, far more is known about that transition than my essay had sug-
gested. The key process was “discipline formation.” More speciﬁcally, Stichweh argued “that
the transition from natural philosophy to physics was a movement away from a relatively unre-
stricted and unbounded system of communication and unsystematic means of reproduction to-
ward more restricted, bounded, and controlled ones.” In this and other respects, Stichweh’s
picture of German physics is entirely consistent with Schaffer’s claims published, quite indepen-
dently, around the same time.4 Olesko goes on to demonstrate that, for all its importance,
2 Against the claim that we lack “empirical studies on the practices of history” see, e.g., J. H. Hexter, The History Primer (New
York: Basic, 1971); Leon J. Goldstein, Historical Knowing (Austin: Univ. Texas Press, 1976); Albert Cook, History/Writing (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988); and Anne Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative Histories of
the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990). Further, the prescriptive literature generated by the historical
profession is peppered with concrete examples of actual practice. See, e.g., C. V. Langlois and C. Seignobos, Introduction to the
Study of History, trans. G. G. Berry (London: Duckworth, 1898); R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, ed. T. M. Knox (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1946); Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1954);
E. H. Carr,What Is History? The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures Delivered in the University of Cambridge, January–March
1961 (London: Macmillan, 1961); G. R. Elton, The Practice of History (Sydney: Sydney Univ. Press, 1967); and John Tosh, The
Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods, and New Directions in the Study of Modern History (London: Longman, 1984).
3
“L’oubli, et je dirai même l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d’une nation”: Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce
qu’une nation? (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882), pp. 7–8.
4 But Stichweh, it appears, stressed the mechanisms of pedagogy, whereas Schaffer laid more emphasis on the intended results of
such pedagogy.
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Stichweh’s 1984 Physik in Deutschland was but part of a larger historiographic tradition that had
begun “over a decade earlier,”most notably in the work of R. Steven Turner, and has continued
ever since. All of this I had wholly neglected: mea culpa!
Nevertheless, the difference is a matter of emphasis: as Olesko puts it, “I agree with Wilson’s
recommendation to pursue the topic, but . . . he views the glass as nearly empty, whereas I view
it as half full.” In fact, the German studies that Olesko discusses serve to bring into sharper
focus a paradox that has lain implicit around this topic for some time. On the one hand, we al-
ready know quite a lot about what the “second scientiﬁc revolution” involved—for instance,
specialization, disciplines (plural), discipline (singular), communication practices, pedagogy,
organizations. On the other hand, we struggle to grasp what all of this added up to, what it
meant and means, how it came about, and whether and in what ways it differed in speciﬁc na-
tional contexts. Hence the fact that work of the mid-1980s, by Schaffer and Stichweh alike, has
yet to be fully assimilated and appreciated. Hence too, perhaps, the way that all three commen-
taries already discussed have abutted on this theme without actually confronting it.
Olesko goes on to suggest a change of terminology and a widening of focus. To the latter
there can be no objection: it is surely correct that the shift from natural philosophy to the sci-
ences needs to be related to the involvement of the “broader public,” to state and empire, and
to the desideratum that knowledge should be useful. But while I agree that “second scientiﬁc
revolution” is an inadequate label, I don’t see Olesko’s terminological proposal catching on:
she suggests “resurrecting a term used by R. Steven Turner: the ‘great transition.’ ” This has al-
ready been used—or, rather, overused—with other and quite different meanings (medieval cli-
mate, the end of the Cold War, Chinese politics, the future environment), precisely because it
is nonspeciﬁc—whereas whatever we call the “second scientiﬁc revolution,” its new and better
name will surely have to include some explicit reference to science.5
I am grateful to these commentators for the trouble they have taken. It is pleasing that they
all endorse the argument of “Science’s Imagined Pasts”—and especially that all of them have
found ways of taking that argument further.
5 For uses of “great transition” in the contexts noted see Bruce Campbell, The Great Transition: Climate, Disease, and Society in
the Late Medieval World (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016); Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American–
Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Hung-Mao Tien, The
Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989);
and Paul Raskin et al., Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead (Boston: Stockholm Environment Institute,
2002).
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